In the first half of the twentieth century, Christian missionaries and Japanese officials both staked out physical terrain in northeast China in which they aimed to establish and expand their respective influence. They did so while embracing divergent senses of mission, yet their views and methods to a great extent coincided. Similarities in views and methods initially engendered mutual respect and cooperation, but a worsening international climate in the 1930s and a simultaneous hardening of Japanese attitudes led to growing mutual suspicions and the termination of this working relationship. Shifting Japanese attitudes, moreover, worsened relations with Chinese.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores how Protestant missionaries, mostly from the United Kingdom, and Japanese official and civilian empire builders set up bases in northeastern Chinese towns and interacted with individual Chinese and with one another. 1 The two groups had similarities in training and outlook, and a sense of mission was present among both. However, while the British presence in Manchuria was generally smaller, the region was vital to Japanese. It was closer to Japan and adjacent Korea, itself under Japanese sway after 1905. Japanese officials sought primacy in China's northeast, and concerned for losing influence, Japanese forces seized the region during the Manchurian Incident, beginning 18 September 1931. Japanese thereafter grew less cooperative with missionaries, the takeover contributing to a warping of the Japanese sense of imperial mission.
Missionaries and empires have a tangled history -the former often perceived as agents of the latter. Brian Stanley and Andrew Porter, however, urged a reconsideration of missionary roles in the expansion and maintenance of the British Empire given the unenthusiastic ways missionaries and imperial officials often viewed one another. Missionaries collaborated but also confronted imperialist endeavours, and debated how they should interact. 2 Yet Ian Copland found colonial conditions promoted collaboration rather than confrontation. 3 Others show how modern and often ethnocentric attitudes formed a common bedrock. 4 Intriguingly, British missionaries found that Japanese imperial officials in northeast China evinced similar attitudes to their own and discovered room for cooperation. This was not due to the fact that the United Kingdom and the Empire of Japan were allies between 1902 and 1923. The two most invested empires in Chinathey were rivals that became estranged, and eventually enemies.
Missionary successes similarly led Japanese to perceive missionaries as rivals, though Ryan Dunch and Lian Xi have questioned missionary roles in Christianity's long-term success in China. 5 Not coincidentally, scholars also differ over China's adoption of modernity -did it emerge as a disciplinary project or organically as a hybridized domestic project in contact with foreigners? 6 Dunch goes so far as to argue it is incorrect to characterize and reforming its administration, in 1907 replacing military governors with the civilian system found elsewhere in China. 11 Manchuria's opening brought foreigners into contact with the other kind of opposition -Chinese society. When the Qing permitted Christianity in 1870, the official proscription of the previous century and a half lent an air of authority to anti-Christian views, and popular attitudes hardened bill sewell CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 with unequal treaties and their exploitation by some missionaries and their flocks. 12 Weir, for example, noted that some of his congregation became Catholic only after "unauthorized action in law cases." 13 Violence accompanied suspicions -in 1891, a mob nearly beat to death Dr. James A. Greig, a Scottish missionary serving with the Irish Presbyterian mission in Changchun (Kuanchengzi) since 1889, on suspicion of kidnapping. 14 James A. Wylie, a Scottish missionary based in Liaoyang in 1888, survived several instances of harassment but was killed at the outset of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 by disorderly Chinese soldiers, perhaps irregulars or Manchus, on their way to Korea. 15 Ten Catholic missionaries died in Manchuria during the Boxer Uprising, including the vicar apostolic of Shenyang -a city known to missionaries and imperialists then as Mukden. All twenty-eight of the Scottish missionaries survived, as did the dozen Irish, in part because of a warning from the Qing Governor-General. 16 However, 332 Protestant Chinese died, about one-sixth of the national total, and about a third of Protestant converts recanted. 17 Recognizing Chinese apprehensions, the Scots in Manchuria sought only justice for those responsible for the 1891 and 1894 incidents and not military intervention. Violence, they reasoned, was a hazard of the job. It was, moreover, like not seeking recourse to unequal treaties provisions -a strategy thought to distinguish them from Catholic missions. Given that Wylie's murderers were not from Liaoyang and did not know him there appeared no reason to change this policy. 18 Missionary correspondence and contemporary publications show they were more concerned about Russia. 19 As the Boxer crisis prompted a Russian invasion suppressing it in 12 Manchuria is now in the military occupation of the Russians and the great political question with us present is whether they will ever give it back to the Chinese. Manchuria is a huge country -I think over ten times the size of Ireland -with great potential wealth. The Russian railway now runs right down through it from north to south that tho' not finished yet trains can run almost the whole way. Nearly all the big cities and towns are occupied by garrisons of several hundred Russian soldiers, and there are numerous smaller posts. 21 Nor was Weir alone. A British official and member of the Royal Geographic Society opined that "with the advent of the Russians [the European and American missionaries] will probably disappear [in Manchuria], as is the case elsewhere whenever Russian authority is established." This was because "[t]he Greek Church, even with all the weight of Russia behind, is not likely to err on the side of overzeal or indiscreet interference with the ancient institutions of the Chinese, as has too frequently been the case with both Roman Catholic and Protestant missions." 22 Others feared Russian expansion meant Protestantism might be restricted in favour of Orthodoxy. 23 The sermon delivered at Weir's 1899 ordination warned that Japan's victory over China in 1895 "was to Russia's interest and I think we may be ready to acknowledge Manchuria's future ruler politically is Russia. Let us hope and pray her bigotry, her supreme absolutism in religion may not be made a condition for the ruled." 24 Weir echoed this at the outset of the Russo-Japanese War, fearing that " [u] nless Russia is driven out by force she has come into Manchuria to stay, and as a Mission we dread future developments." Weir worried "[t]he whole future of mission work [in Manchuria] may be involved" in this war. 25 This was despite Weir's own good relations with Russians. After arriving at his first post in Changchun in 1899, Weir visited a Russian doctor and opened an account at a Russian bank. At the outset of the Boxer Uprising, six months later, he turned to the Russians for aid, escaping to Harbin with Cossacks. He wintered in Vladivostok, learning Russian, and also in Japan. 20 He returned to his post in Changchun with Cossacks, sleeping in fur coats in fields by fireside to deter wild animals as well as for warmth. 26 Weir found he could speak with some of his companions in French, and eventually learned Russian well enough to read newspapers. He thought "the news given in them is far more full and impartial than one might expect from what is said in the hostile English press." Although Russian soldiers arrested him three times during the later Russo-Japanese War, Weir noted, "[T]hese were mere passing incidents. In spite of the war, work could be carried on much as usual and the Russians laid no needless restrictions upon us." 27 Weir also approved of Russian settlement, declaring "Harbin has been properly colonized." 28 Nor was Weir alone in getting along with Russians, as Scottish medical missionaries treated Russians and worked with them. 29 As an Irish missionary gratefully observed after the Boxer crisis, "[i]n Manchuria it was the Russians who came to the rescue." 30 The Russian presence, however, provoked Japan, which joined the imperialist ranks with victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War. Russian diplomacy denied Japan a Chinese cession of land in southern Manchuria in the unequal treaty signed at Shimonoseki, however, and ensuing Russian designs on Manchuria and Korea prompted a Japanese attack on Russian outposts. Although the Qing remained neutral in the Russo-Japanese War, fought mostly in southern Manchuria, some Chinese civilians and irregulars assisted Japanese forces. 31 Japanese Christians, even Quakers, supported Japanese expansion, as the war against Russia was generally popular, though there were occasional rifts with foreign Christian missionaries in Japan. 32
III. ENGAGING MANCHURIA
To gain trust, some missionaries adopted Chinese dress and hairstyles (the queue), though not all agreed -at least one thought it deceptive to camouflage Christianity. 33 Shenyang's 1889 United Presbyterian church could accommodate 500 to 600 under a "pagoda tower." 34 Favouring such adaptation was the Scottish missionary William C. Burns, the first Protestant to establish a mission in Manchuria. A colleague of Hudson Taylor's, founder of the China Inland Mission, Burns arrived in Niuzhuang in 1867. Before dying the next year he wrote the Irish Presbyterian Church urging their establishing a Manchurian mission. The Irish agreed, dispatching two missionaries to Niuzhuang. 35 They arrived in 1869, and were joined in 1872 by John Ross, a missionary from the Scottish United Presbyterian Church. On arrival the only house he could rent was one in which a murder had been committed, so few dared visit, but within ten years he could rent space in almost any town. 36 In 1890 the Scottish and Irish missions merged to form a single Mission Conference, the former working chiefly east of the Liao River and the latter to the west. Danish Lutherans joined them in 1896. 37 Missionaries in Manchuria initially engaged in street preaching and colportage (bookselling), producing slow growth. A robust revival movement emerged in and around Liaoyang in 1908, however, spread from Korea by a Canadian missionary, Dr. Jonathan Goforth, who later settled in Sipinggai. 38 Weir referred to the revival as "volcanic," but recognized its limits. 39 Although another revival occurred in 1932 amidst the Japanese seizure of Manchuria -and one had been ongoing in Japan since 1929 following the Great Depression -revivals' efficacy was limited, facilitating the kind of religious expression often witnessed in China during periods of social turmoil. 40 A more successful method focusing on social welfare transformed the nature of the missionary project, something missionaries called their 34 . . went about their work in a more practical way than any of their colleagues in other parts of China. They paid more attention to education and hygiene than to the teaching of religious dogma, and their hospitals, for the most part destroyed by the Boxers, had been of greatest service in healing sickness and saving life. They were, moreover, the only foreigners in Manchuria, Japanese agents always excepted, who really knew the people, spoke their language, and appreciated their habits of thought. 43 Their most renowned establishment was in the provincial capital of Shenyang -the Mukden Medical College, run by Scottish missionaries who were aided by Irish and Danes. Dugald Christie founded it in 1912, though a hospital had been present since 1883. 44 Caring for people affected by floods, war, and plague helped inform China of missionary medical capabilities, and missionaries attended to officials' families. The reformist Governors-General Zhao Erxun and Xu Shichang both got along well with the Scots and supported their mission financially, as did Zhang Zuolin, Manchuria's military ruler after the 1911 Revolution, all based in Shenyang. 45 Although expanding Japan's empire in Manchuria required war, the Chinese and Russian revolutions of 1911 and 1917 helped render military force secondary to a more accommodating approach for Japanese imperialists as well. A civil rather than military means of engaging China was also appropriate given that Japan affirmed predominance there indirectlyunlike "formal" colonies in Taiwan and Korea, southern Manchuria was 41 an example of "informal" empire. 46 Japanese civilians participated in this endeavour because in addition to consular, police, and military personnel the Japanese presence entailed a commitment to creating a modern society. This was evident in many ways, but represented best by the South Manchuria Railway (smr). Not only did it oversee factories, warehouses, and mines, but self-consciously modern individuals ran it. Having studied the mechanics of other empires, the smr built hotels, schools, hospitals, dams, research facilities, and towns, reporting on their accomplishments in a triumphal manner. 47 Granted, Japanese intended modern facilities chiefly for use by Japanese, but Chinese and other peoples soon gravitated to smr towns to live and do business. And though Japanese sometimes fearedand some Russians intimated -a possible war of revenge, Japanese studied the residue of the Russian empire. In particular, the city of Dalnyrenamed Dairen in Japanese, Dalian in Chinese -inspired urban planners and architects. 48 The architect of this strategy was Gotō Shinpei, a doctor turned administrator who served as the first civilian governor of Taiwan and first smr president. In addition to a strong military presence, Gotō encouraged Chinese acceptance of the Japanese presence by applying what he called " biological principles" of imperialism, encouraging economic development and acknowledging local practices. To insure continuity, Gotō handpicked his staff and successors. 49 Foreigners soon commended Japanese successes. The British consul in Dalian, for example, reported in 1924 that "[f]oreign residents and travelers here agree that Dairen is a very well run city and compares favorably with towns of a similar size in Japan and even elsewhere." 50 The Scottish Presbyterian theologian and educator David Cairns praised Dalian as "Japan's great modern city, her bridge-head in Asia." 51 Such views were common then -by the 1920s Japan was often called the "Britain of Asia."
Missionaries also viewed Japanese favourably, treating Japanese casualties during the Russo-Japanese War. O − yama Iwao, Japan's Commander in Chief in Manchuria, donated 1,000 yen to the Shenyang medical mission. 52 Aware of Japanese Christians, one missionary suggested that Japanese who were not Christians were "so cordial in their sympathy that they may be said to be Christians in all but name." He predicted that "[w]hatever influence Japan may henceforth exert in Manchuria -and undoubtedly her influence will be great whatever form it may take -we have every reason to believe that will be all on the side of the Christian missions." 53 Some missionaries did not even feel the need to proselytize among Japanese, since Japanese missionaries were present. 54 Others approved of Japan's colonizing Korea. 55 Missionaries expected to thrive in Japan's sphere of influence. Weir reported that "[o]ur relations with the Japanese authorities are excellent, and missionaries travel at half rates on their railway." 56 Missionaries praised the smr often -one writing, "I have never seen trains anywhere to beat those on the Japanese railway central routes, and in Korea and Manchuria for efficiency, cleanness, and comfort, and to travel for long summer days through the beautiful country, so full of history and romance, is a very delightful experience." 57 This did not change even with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. One noted, "[T]he courtesy and good management of the railway is as before." 58 Another benefit was peace -one missionary reported that Japanese initiatives "stamped out" banditry across Liaoning Province soon after the Manchurian Incident. 59 Japan's military presence, however, was not without issue. In 1918, for example, four railway guards beat Florence Crawford, an Irish missionary in Changchun, for trespassing near the smr. The Japanese government apologized, recalled the battalion commander, 52 and donated 10,000 gold yen to the local mission. The British government accepted the apology, noting the Japanese responded "fairly." 60 Other issues were more persistent. Japan joined international anti-opium efforts, but drug sales contributed substantially to Japanese colonial government and military revenues. 61 A twenty-year Manchuria resident reported in 1932 that the drug problem had worsened markedly "in the last few years, due to the disturbed state of the country, and also to the fact that the warlords must have money to pay their troops, and opium is one of the most profitable crops on earth." Opium was "a fashionable vice mostly indulged in by those who have influence, power, or wealth. Amongst those classes it is almost universal" and was polite to offer at shops, government offices, or wealthy homes. "Far worse" was heroin and morphine consumed by the poor, thought to be manufactured in Europe and smuggled into China and sold by "low-down foreigners" protected by extraterritoriality. 62 Some Japanese Christians and doctors helped addicts, but many other Japanese were involved in the trade, making Dalian the centre of not only Manchuria's drug trade but also "the global narcotic economy." 63 Japan of course was not the only empire involved in the drug trade. Another uncomfortable similarity with other empires involved military action. One missionary lamented as early as 1894 that "[c]ertainly we have no reason to be proud of the teaching of our Western civilisation. Less than thirty years ago Japan was absolutely closed to it. Now we find that what Japan has learned from it most quickly and thoroughly is neither good government nor Christian morality, but how to spend millions in forging and using the Western machinery of war." 64 Some Canadian missionary views of Japan began to sour during the Russo-Japanese War, or with Korea's annexation. 65 In 1919 a Shenyang missionary observed: bill sewell CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 he interpenetrates; in war he grips where treasure lies. The flag of Japan is the commonest in Chinese ports. In Manchuria and Shandong the hand of Japan lies on the railway systems. Even in the very heart of China the iron mines have been secured for Japan. Japanese gendarmery has planted its sentries in the streets of Mukden [Shenyang] . The soldiery of China are armed and drilled under Japanese "advisors." 66 In another place and time this might describe an advancing British Empire, illustrating modern imperialism's parallel tracks, and growing anti-imperialism put missionaries at odds with all empires. 67 A common concern involved modernity itself. One of Cairns's chief concerns was not paganism -he thought many Asian religions were dying -but western secularism. His 1927 Asian tour focused chiefly on this struggle since he thought Asians were rapidly acquiring a materialist perspective common in Europe. 68 A missionary in north Manchuria foreshadowed this in 1922:
The Yellow Peril is not a military but an economic one, resting on the fact of China's being an inexhaustible fountain of cheap labor, capable of flooding the West with cheap goods. Big business in Europe, America, and Japan is very well aware of this fact, and is losing no time in inaugurating industrialism in China, and harnessing all this cheap energy to big capitalistic enterprises. . . . The heart of the unrest all over the East is the fact that two civilizations are in conflict -the Western and the Eastern. The civilization that the Japanese are ramming down the throats of Chinese is not the Eastern, but the Western. It is our picture-houses, radios, machines, railways, telephones, factories, electricity, music, theatres, dance-halls, sports, bicycles, cameras, and motor-cars that are being forced on unwilling recipients. The Chinese masses neither wish nor admire them. Their one wish is to be let alone. But nothing can stop the wild inrush of the West. . . . The Chinese have been cut adrift from their old moorings, and are like a ship without a compass or rudder. 69 Japan's Manchurian sphere of influence was challenged in the 1920s as well, especially by Chinese nationalism and a revived Soviet Union. Yet while other imperialists began considering returning unequal treaty privileges, by 1930 Japan "displaced Great Britain as the paramount foreign economic power in China," making Japan more dependent on maintaining imperialist prerogatives. 70 The response of some in the military was to seize Manchuria and create the puppet state of Manchukuo. This antagonized foreign communities, but some Britons in China publicly supported the Japanese takeover given that their privileges in China were threatened too. 71 The incident also emboldened other Japanese to seek more slices of Chinese territory, leading ultimately to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (7 July 1937) and the Second Sino-Japanese War -Japan's China garrison reinforced quickly with troops from Korea and Manchuria. For Eri Hotta, among others, the Manchurian Incident was the moment when Japanese policy began pivoting from international cooperation to pursuing regional dominance. 72
IV. DYNAMICS OF MANCHURIAN SUCCESSES
The growth of Protestant congregations in Manchuria was slow but steady. The Irish and Scottish missions claimed 12,000 in 1903, almost 13,000 in 1918, 17,000 in 1928, and 32,335 out of the 50,000 Protestants in all Manchuria in 1941. 73 These lagged behind Catholic figures given their hidden communities dating back centuries -there were perhaps 7,000 Catholics in Manchuria when Protestant missionaries first arrived. The Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris, initially active in rural areas so as to avoid the officials and scholars most committed to the old social order, claimed 27,000 in 1903, 56,000 in 1918, and 61,000 in 1940. 74 All relied on modern means, but more was going on behind this success than that.
A significant change was in receptivity, as Chinese became aware that imperialism involved new technologies and systems enabling a handful of countries to colonize almost the entire world. Chinese society was also less stable in the late Qing, and less so after the revolution in 1911. Some missionaries reported growing interest in both science and bible study among bill sewell CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 wealthier and more educated Chinese then. 75 The social reform aspects of missionary work in particular appealed to Chinese in the late Qing and Republican eras. While reform-minded Chinese typically remained hostile to evangelical missionaries, "towards the 'secular missionary' . . . they evinced a new sense of camaraderie, even going so far as to cast themselves, for a brief but intense moment, in the role of disciples" as early as the 1890s. 76 The Irish Presbyterian Church only accepted ministers, doctors, and teachers for foreign work, which meant that not only were missionaries trained at their families' expense, but they were also good representatives of European modernity. Other British missionaries were also educated. 77 Student activists bolstered the missionary project in the late nineteenth century, notably the Student Volunteer Missionary Union of Great Britain and Ireland (1892). Highlighting this movement in Asia were the British " Cambridge Seven" arriving in 1885 and the Irish "Famous Five" in 1895, two of whom, Frederick O'Neill and John Omelvena, went to Manchuria. These men would become known as exemplars of the missionary impulse. 78 Japanese officials were also typically university graduates. Most were products of Japan's premier universities, but some were also graduates of Takushoku ("Colonial") University, so named in 1918 though initially established in 1900 as a post-secondary institution for the administration of Taiwan. These institutions were part of a larger reform effort, as the Japanese state school system appeared in a more comprehensive form earlier than in Britain. 79 Many smr employees and others active in Manchuria, such as architects, were similarly educated and joined professional associations even when overseas. 80 And as in Britain, educated Japanese Christians were often social reformers, identifying progressive officials with whom they could work. 81 Educated Christians were prominent critics of Japanese imperialism, including the academic Yanaihara Tadao and journalist and pacifist Uchimura Kanzō.
Youthful idealism was also evident in the Japanese empire, but similarities with missionaries go beyond this. 82 Similar backgrounds produced similar approaches. Anyone perusing the missionary and Japanese archives will likely be struck by a common tone. Confidence in future progress is palpable, but enthusiasm is muted in favour of dispassionate analysis. Also apparent are arrays of statistics, especially with regard to financing. For missionaries, these initially reported expenses to home congregations. Accounting practices eventually extended, however, to include student enrolments and medical costs. Coinciding with the establishment of national statistical bureaus across Europe and North America in the late nineteenth century, statistics, sometimes referred to as the science of government, may be considered intrinsic to any modern approach. Japanese empire builders and their supporters similarly compiled economic, demographic, and other statistics -the smr even created its own research agency.
Not only were British missionaries and Japanese empire builders modern, they perceived themselves as modern. In Taiwan, missionaries "were products of the best educations the West could provide and [saw] themselves as social scientists and naturalists as well as men of the cloth." 83 Having reformed their government and society extensively after 1868, Japanese often identified themselves and their society as explicitly modern. And modernity played a key role in the manner in which Japanese extended their empire. Not only did Japanese reforms encourage officials to regard Japan as Asia's natural leader, but, having studied European colonial practices, they were in a position to build what they thought was a modern empire. 84 Commitments to modernity were also evident in efforts to woo Chinese officials and individuals, apparent in outlooks as well as in building schools and hospitals. After his foray into Manchuria, for example, David Cairns recognized Asia's need for industrial revolution, and wrote of the need to send young students to China capable of "stat[ing] the full Christian message in terms of modern thought." 85 Both missionaries and Japanese authorities used schools and hospitals to reach out to individual Chinese, and some missionaries and Japanese realized they were engaged in a kind of competition. While one Scottish missionary reported that Chinese in Manchuria were becoming particular as to which hospitals to visit, looking especially for modern equipment, Irish missionaries noted that Japanese hospitals were medical rivals. 86 Canadian Presbyterian missionaries stationed in eastern Manchuria appear to have thought similarly -one suggested it would be "a shame to put a school at Yongjung [ Longjing] that cannot compete favorably with any Japanese school." 87 In addition to invoking Pan-Asian slogans, Manchukuo officials seeking legitimacy remained committed to fostering modernity. 88 However, Manchukuo developed with little real commitment to improving Chinese society. Contrary to the promise of ethnic harmony, the puppet state allowed earlier Japanese perceptions of Chinese inferiority to be transformed into a racial hierarchy often maintained violently. 89 Manchukuo's new capital ostensibly represented a new beginning with Japan leading fellow Asians into a reformed world, but that façade only masked an assertion of Japanese supremacy. 90 In reality, Manchukuo's modernizing message was aimed at mobilizing Japanese. This continued during wartime, evident in calls for a New Order in Asia and in the renovation of society and the economy by imperial bureaucrats in Japan, with some policies first tested in Manchukuo. 91 China understandably viewed Japanese military actions with dismay, and anti-Japanese sentiments became more widespread and intense, especially after the Manchurian Incident. Economic need, however, drove Chinese migration to Manchuria -more than a million immigrants arrived annually between 1927 and 1929. Immigration declined following the incident and war's outbreak in 1937, but peaked soon after each in 1934-35 and 86 A.J. Young 1939-40. 92 Japanese transportation facilitated this migration, and Japanese recruiters south of the Great Wall promised employment. 93 Beginning in 1937, a wave of Japanese corporations established branches in China, following the military's advance. Individual Chinese were willing to take part in missionary and Japanese projects in Manchuria because conversion, education, and commercialization could unfold as part of China's regeneration. 94 In other words, Chinese nationalism did not necessarily preclude foreign connections. The Protestant medical missionary Dugald Christie recognized this, suggesting that Chinese nationalism was itself modern and nothing to fear, insisting "[t]he Nationalist movement is the natural outcome of the teaching of Christianity, and of the extension of Western education" (emphasis in original). 95 Not all, of course, agreed. Although Chinese nationalism in the long run turned out to be more secular than religious -many nationalists denounced Christianity as a superstitious relic -the fact that there were Chinese who converted shows Christianity was a viable option. The cooperation of Chinese and other peoples with Japan's agendas in Manchuria, of course, was unavoidable once Japan established enclave communities and the smr. And while the chaos of warlordism provided some potential for winning Chinese support in Manchukuo, Japan failed to exploit that. 96 Instances of Chinese "collaborationism" -meaning ideological identification with Japan -proved few. 97 In this respect, missionaries were much more successful.
The cohorts considered here reveal overlapping concerns, and some similarities in motivation. Missionaries and empire builders were motivated by bill sewell CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 a sense of righteous action in the service of particular goals. The Protestant missionary movement emerged out of an evangelism freshly experienced at home. A similarly creative environment propelled Japanese at home and overseas. Building an empire involved risks, but promised a rejuvenated imperial society that was prosperous and beyond the reach of outside threats. Japanese empire builders, moreover, emerged out of a self-consciously modernizing ideological milieu, dedicated to the establishment of a stable and benevolent empire, with a faith in the correctness of their endeavour. Japanese empire builders were thus evangelizing in a sense, consciously seeking local allies in their extension of empire, locals that could be won over to their cause. They did not succeed, and after the Manchurian and China Incidents, turned inward. Justifying expansion, the notion of hakkō ichiu ("the eight corners of the world under one roof") gained currency after 1940, a slogan that not only betrays a sense of ethnocentrism but also of manifest destiny. This perspective reached its zenith with the declaration of "holy war" during the Pacific War. Even some Japanese Christians joined in, associating Japan's wartime actions with divine purpose. 98
V. THE SENSE OF MISSION
Having entered Manchuria by force of arms, missionaries and imperialists could only engage Manchuria successfully by offering that which Chinese society willingly embraced. To entrench their work, missionaries and imperialists had also to enlist individual Chinese to join their causes. In this the missionaries had the upper hand.
Japan's efforts were constrained by the nature of the imperialist project, which entailed a dynamic of its own. In addition to imposing authority and influence overseas, the act of creating an empire had repercussions at home. In an era of emergent mass nationalism, empire helped define national identities. In Victorian Britain, Wallace Mills observed that "empire became a pivotal aspect of national identity and meaning" because imperialism renewed the focus on imperial rule while it fostered public activism amid a growing sense of crisis. Empire was "pivotal" "[b]ecause it was both ends and means . . . the fact that it could be perceived to be more than one end, or to serve as more than one means to other ends, meant that disparate elements in British society believed in the crucial importance of empire." As a result, "[i]mperialism was not simply 'like a religion'; for many people who called themselves 'imperialists,' it was a religion" (emphasis in original). Without denying "economic, political, and strategic concerns . . .
[t]he religious focus helps to explain the intense enthusiasm with which initiatives into empire were supported." Mills concluded that this renewed 98 Ion, Cross in the Dark Valley, 251-256. "sense of 'mission' and destiny fused the religious and the secular," linking missionaries with various officials to redefine imperialism as both moral and material. With success, "[t]he empire became a transcendent national mission and purpose." And as the nation could rally around the empire, imperialism could replace selfish individualism with the virtues so frequently extolled by imperialists: courage, manliness, self-sacrifice, devotion to duty, and patriotism. It was in these contexts that imperialists could insist that imperialism was moral and spiritual, as much as economic and military. . . . And it is in these same contexts that imperialism can be called a religion and, in view of its focus on society and civic duties and responsibilities, a "civil religion." 99 Although Mills wrote about British society, he could easily have been writing about Japanese society. Favourable views of emperor and empire were as much a means of affirming a particular identity as they were about domestic reform, treaty revision, and establishing Japan's place in the world. Japanese officials continued to emphasize an imperial identity as tensions emerged with urbanization and industrialization. 100 The acquisition of empire and the lurching crises it entailed reinforced such efforts, prompting Japanese society to reconceive Japan, China, and the roles of these two states within Asia, involving public debate. 101 In addition to official efforts, a variety of "continental adventurers" and military men made independent initiatives overseas to build the empire. In the 1930s Japanese society mobilized more broadly, involving not only officials but also a range of civilian activists -what Louise Young has called "total empire." 102 Creating Manchukuo in particular emboldened those who saw Pan-Asianism as a cure for Japan's conflicted state of affairs. 103 Government publications like the Principles of the National Policy (1937) sought to define the Japanese "national essence" in ways that included, significantly, Manchuria. 104 Domestically, these efforts paid off -there was no public protest of the Asia-Pacific War. Even if State Shinto ultimately failed as a national creed, the wide and public discussion of values and national identities insured broadly shared attitudes. As Winston Davis has noted, "[d]uring the decades of hyperventilated nationalism which preceded the Pacific War, being Japanese was itself a kind of religious affiliation." Moreover, "[t]oo complicated to be identified with Shinto alone, the halo of symbols and slogans and emotions which congealed around Japan in those years would better be denoted by some more general term such as 'civil religion.'" This was because Japanese officials sought "to create a feeling of national unity and dedication" so that their decisions could be "beautified as the 'wish' of the imperial ancestors." 105 Individual commitments to empire varied, of course, but broadly shared perceptions made it unlikely that Japanese in Manchuria would elicit much Chinese support, especially after the Manchurian Incident. Japanese dominance of the puppet state left not only little room but also little incentive for anyone interested in joining the empire as occurred in Taiwan. 106 Protestant missionaries, however, proved adept at settling down amicably in China, establishing "peaceful coexistence between adherents of the church and their non-Christian neighbors. What was emerging from the locally negotiated Christian accommodation to prevailing social arrangements was a kind of Chinese folk Christianity, largely constructive and non-threatening." 107 The establishment of a native church, moreover, was an early missionary goal. One publication in 1900 intoned that "[i]t is the earnest desire of our missionaries in China to build up a strong and active native church on the one true foundation -a Church which by-and-bye will be able to manage its own affairs and to propagate itself by missionary effort without foreign aid." This was to include "the training of native evangelists and teachers and the preparing of suitable men for the pastorate." 108 While Japanese imperialists tended to seek out supporters of their empire, missionaries sought out their replacements. Indeed, given the relative paucity of foreign missionaries, "China was not evangelized by missionaries, but largely by Chinese themselves." What the unequal treaties and the missionary presence may have provided most was a cohesive structure and useful foreign links. 109 The rise of a native church was part of a global effort to establish self-supporting congregations. The 1910 World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh determined that all Indigenous peoples should have more say, and a 1922 Shanghai Conference, including some twenty delegates from Manchuria, reportedly strengthened the "Chinese Church." 110 In 1927 the Presbyterian home churches placed the entire mission force in Manchuria at the disposal of the Manchurian Church. At this point the movement seemed sufficiently large to prevent the rise of heterodoxy. A separate church, however, was independent of overseas oversight, and in Manchuria the Irish faced the problem of "separatist congregations" in 1912, 1922, and 1933 . In these instances one-time members attempted to establish an "Independent Church" outside of what they perceived to be foreign control. 111 The need to assure orthodoxy in introducing a new epistemological paradigm, however, attests to the reality that even if missionaries were not serving any empire they still served an ecclesiastical network, a spiritual empire. Such a perspective returns us to the view that missionaries were more like how they appeared in earlier studies -as imperialists of a kind. This makes it difficult to distance missionaries from empire, for evangelization in and of itself entailed new forms of social organization -integrated with a central body located beyond China's borders -and a new mental framework.
This said, if missionaries retain an imperialist characteristic, they offered an aura of authenticity for Chinese peoples that Japanese imperialists lacked, as Christian missions satisfied more of the desires of Manchurian society than the empire. Indeed, in Shenyang, some embraced the memories of certain missionaries as local guardian spirits -Drs. Arthur Jackson bill sewell CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 and Dugald Christie. 112 This aura grew after 1931 when not only did Manchurian Chinese seek refuge in churches, but Manchurian towns were said to be "buzzing with the Christian movement" -in one "[t]he sluice gates are open." 113 In Beizhen, one reported women converts in outstations especially noticeable after the revival. 114 Protestant Canadians in eastern Manchuria reported growth in their congregations through at least 1937, despite being told to reduce their educational work by Japanese authorities. Other Canadian missionaries sought to expand into Mongolia that same year. 115 A growing church that empowered the local populace, potentially disdainful of imperialist projects, could well pose a challenge to Japanese imperialism in the 1930s, as presaged by experiences in Korea. There, missionary defiance of Japanese rule and Japan's recourse to heavy-handed methods helped to differentiate between missionary and Japanese projects, making it clear that missionaries represented not only an anti-imperialist challenge, but also an alternative modernity. As a result, a new generation of Japanese empire builders set out to actively discourage the missionary enterprise in Manchukuo. Indeed, some Manchurian missionaries feared that Japan would learn from the Korean experience and not leave foreign missions intact after assuming political control. 116 Most missionaries, however, were not overly concerned by the takeover initially, as the creation of Manchukuo even enhanced missionaries' prestige. Diplomas from mission schools gained legal recognition in the new regime, resulting in increased enrollments. 117 Such boons proved short lived. Earlier instances of cooperation were withdrawn, as railway discounts were reduced from fifty percent to twenty percent in the late 1930s and subsequently terminated in 1941. 118 Missionaries eventually required police permits to travel, and often did not receive them. 119 By 1940, moreover, "the Japanese had . . . every department regimented and tabbed. Minute details of all foreign workers had to be supplied to government offices, involving hours and hours of precious time." 120 Japanese officials harassed and intimidated not only missionaries but also individual Chinese into disassociating with missionaries. 121 Japan also censored missionary correspondence, making it unsafe to communicate criticisms of Japanese rule to the outside world. 122 Even missionaries who made public statements overseas were subject to scrutiny -one whose critical comments were published in a local paper in Montreal was approached by the British Consul with a Japanese demand for an apology. 123 Yet, many missionaries did not want to leave Manchuria, despite increasing hostility from Japanese there. 124 This was partially because hospitals remained busy, even with reduced staff. 125 And in staying, missionaries furthered their aura of authenticity for Chinese converts -following their arrests, converts continued to resist. 126 Japanese officials also sought to reform Christianity itself. In Japan, the Religious Organizations Law of 1939 gave the government the power to disband problematic religious organizations, supplemented by 1941 revisions to the Peace Preservation Law. That year the government helped establish and later guide the United Church of Christ in Japan, a union of thirty-four Protestant denominations. This resulted in not only doctrinal reforms but also Christian participation in State Shinto, compelling Christians to resort to accommodative tactics in order to survive. 127 State reforms involved removing foreign personnel and financing from the Church and establishing new regulations insuring that the faith was practiced in ways deemed appropriate for the empire. 128 One Briton feared CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 for a redefinition of Christianity, as in Korea, with the bible purged of "Jewish elements and the accretions of western superstition through the centuries. The Old Testament is to be thrown into the discard and the ancient mythology of Japan is to be substituted." 129 Japanese also required popular worship at Shinto Shrines in Japan and across the empire, sanctifying what until then had been treated as a civil act, a change that prompted missionary expressions of concern. 130 Some Manchurian Chinese pastors received new training in Japan. 131 Actions like these put Manchurian missionaries in a difficult spot. Many did not wish to antagonize Japanese officials for fear of jeopardizing missions or driving moderate Japanese away. After eventually agreeing to close mission schools after 1942 and to sell some church properties, many missionaries agreed to leave. Those who did not were interned soon after the outbreak of war. Those who left at least did not have to witness the transformation of their schools, which bec[a]me little better than drill grounds and barracks. No instruction is given in Government schools scarcely. Pupils who sometime come to us from such schools are so ignorant that nothing can be done with them. Teachers do not go to their classes and there is no decent supervision. The schools seem to be used as a method of keeping what is presumably still the most intelligent proportion of the nation's youth under control of a kind and of having them where they can be easily found. Education in any real sense of the term has ceased. And the Government was quite determined that our schools would be no exception. The policy is one of reducing the Chinese population to the status of hewers of wood and drawers of water. Apart altogether from questions of the significance of Confucian rites or shrine attendance education has become impossible. 132 Scottish missionaries had planned in the event of war on gathering in Shenyang, but after 8 December 1941, Japanese interned all male Protestant and Catholic missionaries together until June 1942. 133 Then, along with missionaries from more distant parts of Manchuria, internees were sent to Japan to await repatriation. Some, chiefly Americans, were repatriated that April. 134 Others remained in Japan, interned with missionaries based there for the duration of the war, provoking speculation as to their whereabouts. 135 Some voices believed to be of Shenyang missionaries were heard in Canada on shortwave radio in 1942, expecting to be sent to Shanghai for repatriation. 136 Sent first to Kobe, they were instead dispersed, some to Nagasaki in July 1944. There they survived a halfdozen air raids, including the dropping of an atomic bomb. After that, the attitudes of Japanese in Nagasaki to the missionaries became friendlier, even providing wine and cigarettes on the announcement of Japan's surrender. 137 The Scottish office in Edinburgh learned on 3 September that seven of their missionaries had survived the blast, with minor injuries from flying glass, and that thirty-nine others were unharmed. 138 Ultimately it was the Japanese builders of empire who were more completely evicted from Manchuria, as many of the Christian congregations reformed in the postwar era, albeit with mostly new personnel from overseas. Some even arrived in time to greet Chinese Communist troops. Missionaries reportedly received a warmer welcome than Soviet forces, who reportedly "behaved abominably." 139 Within a few years, however, missionaries witnessed the gradual institution of a new constellation of regulations, along with the compilation of dossiers on citizens and the closing of churches once again. 140 A new order, modern and full of another faith, had arrived.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Successful expansion of the Christian missionary and Japanese imperial projects in Manchuria depended on timing, social flux, shifting mindsets, flexible approaches, and willing partners. Enhanced authority by either group, however, resulted in growing suspicions -mutually as well as among Chinese. Both groups were ultimately expelled, but while Christianity managed to regain some of its earlier prestige, the Japanese Empire continues to be vilified in China. This said, tensions regarding the authority of Christian churches remain present in the People's Republic.
